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1. INTRODUCTION
Both directors and controlling shareholders are vested with the
power to exercise control over the property of others. While the com-
mon law has recognized strict fiduciary duties binding the directors of a
company,' it has refused to impose a general fiduciary duty on control-
ling shareholders. The voting power of the majority shareholders has
been restricted, on the other hand, by the common law in two catego-
ries of cases: where a resolution relates to the alteration of the com-
pany's memorandum and articles of association and where a resolution
is tainted by "fraud on the minority."
Israeli corporate law, though generally based on English company
law,2 has recently departed from the English view with regard to the
fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders. English law denies the im-
position of a fiduciary duty on controlling shareholders to minority
shareholders. Israeli law, however, has veered toward the American
view, which favours imposing a fiduciary duty on controlling
shareholders.
The purpose of this article is to trace the development of Israeli
law in this field, comparing it with English and American law. Fur-
ther, it shall examine the extent to which a general fiduciary duty
should be recognized on the part of controlling shareholders in England
and in Israel. This examination will explore the underlying rationale
for the recognition of a fiduciary duty in this field. By focusing on the
relevant statutory provisions of England and Israel, this article will
shed light on the attitudes of these countries' legislatures towards a fi-
* Dr. Jur., Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Bar-Ilan University, Israel. I
wish to express my gratitude to my colleague, Dr. Yedidia Z. Stern, for his helpful
comments.
1 See Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, [1967] 2 A.C. 134.
2 The Israeli Companies Ordinance of 1929, LAWS OF PALESTINE, vol. 1, ch. 22
(1933), is based mainly on the English Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 23.
(The current version of this ordinance is Companies Ordinance (New Version) 1983,
Laws of the State of Israel, New Version 37). In various matters not dealt with by the
Ordinance, Israeli case law has taken a similar position as English common law. Re-
cently, however, a tendency has developed to prefer United States law on certain topics,
including the topics considered in this article.
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duciary duty on the part of controlling shareholders. Finally, a conclu-
sion in favour of recognizing a general fiduciary duty of controlling
shareholders does not address the issue of the scope of such a duty.
Should the controlling shareholders' fiduciary duty be equivalent to the
fiduciary duty owed by the directors of a company? This question will
be considered in the last part of the article, where the scope of the duty
regarding the use of control and its disposal will be examined.
2. JUSTIFICATION FOR RECOGNIZING A GENERAL FIDUCIARY
DUTY
The law imposes a fiduciary duty on anyone who has the power to
control the property of another person.' For this reason, fiduciary du-
ties exist in the following relationships: a trustee towards a benefi-
ciary,4 an agent towards a principal, 5 a guardian towards a legally in-
competent person,6 a promoter towards the company which will
eventually come into being,7 and directors toward a company.8 As long
as the power of control exists, it carries the risk of abuse or exploita-
tion; it may be used in favour of the person in whom it is vested to the
detriment of the other parties. Consequently, in such a case, the law
imposes a fiduciary duty on those who wield this power.9 In this way,
the law deters fiduciaries from misusing their power and compensates
the injured party when deterrence fails.
Controlling shareholders have the power to control the property of
others; they may make decisions concerning the company's property
and influence the rights of the other shareholders. This power is de-
rived from the democratic principle on which the company's activity is
based. The majority can direct the company's actions and may bind the
minority by its decisions. Generally, the law imposes a fiduciary duty
on anyone controlling another's property. As controlling shareholders
effectively control the company's and the minority's property, such a
general fiduciary duty should apply to controlling shareholders.
I See Davis, Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decision-making: Some Theoretical
Perspectives, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1985); Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAM-
BRIDGE L.J. 69; Sealy, Some Principles of Fiduciary Obligations, 1963 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 119; Shepherd, Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 LAW.
Q. REV. 51 (1981).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959); see also P. PETTIT, EQ-
UITY AND THE LAW OF TRUSTS ch. 20 (6th ed. 1989).
G. FRIEDMAN, LAW OF AGENCY 152-63 (5th ed. 1983).
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 7 comment b (1959).
7 H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES § 104 (3d ed. 1983).
8 Id. at § 235.
See Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795 (1983).
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Have the courts come to the same conclusion? This question shall
be examined in regard to the common law systems of England, the
United States, and Israel.
2.1. The English Approach
English case law has recognized a shareholder's voting rights as
property. The owner of such rights may use them as she wishes. As
Jessel, M.R., put it, "[Tjhose who have the rights of property are enti-,
tled to exercise them, whatever their motives may be for such exercise -
that is as regards a court of Law as distinguished from a court of mo-
rality or conscience, if such a court exists."10 Similarly, Justice Walton
declared:
When a shareholder is voting for or against a particular res-
olution, he is voting as a person owing no fiduciary duty to
the company who is exercising his own right of property as
he sees fit. The fact that the result of the voting at the meet-
ing (or at a subsequent poll) will bind the company cannot
affect the position that in voting, he is voting simply in exer-
cise of. his own property rights."1
Despite this broad enunciation of the law, limitations on the
power of a shareholder to use her voting rights have been recognized.
Such limitations relate to two categories of cases. The first category of
cases involves the alteration of the memorandum and articles of associa-
tion. English law recognizes limitations on the power of the majority,
against the minority's wishes, to alter the terms of the contract en-
shrined in the company's constitution. The majority's power is subject
not only to express statutory limitations, but also to equitable rules laid
down by case law. English case law has held that the majority may
alter the company's constitution only when this power is exercised in
good faith for the benefit of the company. 2
The second category of cases involves "fraud on the minority." It
is established law that the majority cannot pass a resolution involving
"fraud on the minority." This term has been clarified by the courts and
does not include every case in which the minority finds itself
prejudiced. Two specific categories of fraud on the minority have be-
come accepted. The first type of case entails the expropriation of the
10 Pender v. Lushington, 6 Ch. D. 70, 75 (M.R. 1877).
" Northern Counties Sec. Ltd. v. Jackson & Steeple Ltd., [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1133,
1144 (Ch.).
12 See Allen v. Gold Reefs of W. Africa, Ltd., [1900] 1 Ch. 656 (C.A.); Rights &
Issues Inv. Trust Ltd. v. Stylo Shoes Ltd., [1965] Ch. 250, 256.
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company's property by the majority. The classic example of this cate-
gory is the case of Cook v. Deeks.'3 In Cook, the directors entered into a
contract in their own names, when they should have entered into it for
the company. The court held that the act could not be ratified by a
majority of the shareholders, since the profits derived from the contract
by the directors belonged to the company, under the rules of equity.
The majority's decision to ignore the rights of the company amounted
to fraud on the minority and hence was invalid.
14
The second type of fraud on the minority is the expropriation of
the minority's property by the majority. The majority cannot make use
of its power to take over the shares of the minority. Thus, an alteration
of the articles, under which a shareholder would be bound to transfer
his shares on written demand by holders of 90% of the issued capital,
has been held invalid. In Brown v. British Abrasive Wheel Co. Ltd.,"5
the basis for the proposed alteration was the company's urgent need for
additional capital. The majority, holding 98% of the shares, was pre-
pared to supply the company capital on condition that it could acquire
the minority's shares. Even though it was not alleged that the majority
was lacking good faith, the court refused to approve the alteration. The
court held that the majority could not use its power to expropriate the
shares of the minority.16 For a similar reason, a resolution to alter the
articles which would enable the general meeting to compel the sale of a
member's shares at fair value to a person designated by the board of
directors was held invalid.
1 7
Is it right for the fiduciary duty of controlling shareholders to be
confined to these cases only? This author believes that no such limita-
tion should exist. This duty exists in order to restrain the power vested
See Cook v. Deeks, [1916] 1 A.C. 554 (P.C.).
14 Id. at 564. This ruling was also accepted by the High Court of Australia in
Ngurli Ltd. v. McCann, 90 C.L.R. 425, 447-48 (Austl. 1954).
25 [1919] 1 Ch. 290.
11 Id. at 295-96. Brown was distinguished in Sidebottom v. Kershaw, Leese & Co.
Ltd., [1920] 1 Ch. 154 (C.A.). In Sidebottom, an alteration of the articles was ap-
proved, which obligated a shareholder, who belonged to a business in competition with
the company, to transfer his shares for a fair value upon the directors' request. In
contrast to Brown, the court recognized that the alteration in this case was passed in
good faith for the benefit of the company as a whole. The alteration enabled the com-
pany to rid itself of shareholders belonging to a competing business. It is at least ques-
tionable whether it is right to compel a shareholder to transfer his shares just because
he holds shares in a competing business, particularly if the company is a large one
where the shareholder has a relatively small number of shares.
17 See Dafen Tinplate Co. Ltd. v. Llanelly Steel Co. (1907) Ltd., [1920] 2 Ch.
124. The court distinguished the case before it from Sidebottom holding that the Side-
bottom decision went further than was required to protect the company from sharehold-
ers who were able to harm its interests. Dafen Tinplate Co. Ltd., [1920] 2 Ch. at 137-
38.
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in the controlling shareholders to prevent its misuse. That rationale is
not unique to the cases outlined above; it applies to all of the conduct of
controlling shareholders.
By examining the reasoning put forth by Lindley, M.R., for im-
posing a fiduciary duty on majority shareholders in the case of altera-
tion of the memorandum and articles of association, 8 it is clear that all
resolutions entrusted to shareholders should be treated the same as the
resolutions in this category. Lindley states:
The power thus conferred on companies to alter the regula-
tions contained in their articles is limited only by the provi-
sions contained in the statute and the conditions contained in
the company's memorandum of association. Wide, however,
as the language of s. 50 is, the power conferred by it must,
like all other powers, be exercised subject to those general
principles of law and equity which are applicable to all pow-
ers conferred on majorities and enabling them to bind minor-
ities. It must be exercised, not only in the manner required
by law, but also bona fide for the benefit of the company as
a whole, and it must not be exceeded. These conditions are
always implied, and are seldom, if ever, expressed.' 9
Why should a fiduciary duty be imposed on the majority when it
alters the company's constitution? Such a duty cannot be explained by
the importance of such a power. Nor can the possibility of harm to the
minority, through the exercise of the power, justify this exception. After
all, there are other shareholders' powers which are just as important
and just as potentially harmful. Such powers include: resolutions to
wind up the company; resolutions on important matters connected with
company policy, where under the company's constitution these matters
are within the jurisdiction of the general meeting; and a declaration or
non-declaration of a dividend. In addition to the powers conferred on
the general meeting by statute and by the company's constitution, the
general meeting is endowed with the authority to exercise the powers of
the board of directors in cases where the latter is unable to function.
This situation may arise when the board is unable to obtain a quorum
or when it is deadlocked on an issue.2° Thus, the existence of a fiduci-
ary duty for controlling shareholders in this context was brought about
1S Allen v. Gold Reefs of W. Africa, Ltd., [1900] 1 Ch. 656 (C.A.).
19 Id. at 671.
20 See, e.g., Alexander Ward & Co. Ltd. v. Samyang Navigation Co. Ltd., [1975]
1 W.L.R. 673 (H.L.).
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empirically; it is devoid of any legal or logical basis.21
Given these circumstances, the lack of uniformity in English legal
literature regarding the question of the fiduciary duty of controlling
shareholders is understandable. Gower favors the recognition of a fidu-
ciary duty on the majority towards the minority.22 He states:
[A]lthough members, unlike directors, are not required to act
bona fide in the interests of others, they, like directors, must
exercise their powers for a proper corporate purpose. The
purpose is proper if it is to benefit the company or the gen-
erality of the members or class concerned. It is improper if it
is primarily to injure other members, or perhaps, to benefit
extraneous interests, whether of the persons voting for the
resolution or of third parties.2"
As authority for recognition of that duty, Gower cites Clemens v.
Clemens Bros. Ltd.24 The case concerned an aunt and her niece (the
plaintiff), who together solely held the company's outstanding stock.
The aunt had control of the company, with ownership of 55% of the
company's voting stock. Moreover, the aunt, unlike the plaintiff, was a
director of the company. The resolution on which the litigation turned
increased the company's capital by 1650 shares. Each new share was to
be equal in status, in all respects, to the existing shares. Under the
resolution, 850 of the new shares were to be allotted to the employees
and 800 were to be equally divided among the four directors of the
company. The plaintiff objected to the resolution, arguing that it
harmed her in several respects: a) by reducing the dividend to which
she was entitled from four-ninths to two-ninths; b) by eliminating a
capital profit, following the evaluation of the shares intended to be al-
lotted at a sum lower than their real value; c) by reducing the plain-
tiff's voting power in the company from 45% to 24.65%; and d) by
curtailing her right to acquire the shares in the event of their transfer,
thereby perpetuating her minority status.25
The court allowed the claim for annulment of the resolution. 26 It
held that the resolution's aim was to prejudice the plaintiff by reducing
her voting power to below 25%. In this way, the plaintiff would be
deprived of the power to prevent the passage of a special resolution
21 See Prentice, Restraints on the Exercise of Majority Shareholder Power, 92
LAW Q. REv. 502, 506 (1976).
22 L. GOWER, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW (4th ed. 1979).
23 Id. at 629.
24 Clemens v. Clemens Bros. Ltd., [1976] 2 All E.R. 268 (Ch.).
25 Id. at 276.
26 Id. at 282.
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without her consent.
The court denied the right of the controlling shareholder in the
company to vote at her own option, holding that:
Miss Clemens is not entitled to exercise her majority vote in
whatever way she pleases. The difficulty is in finding a prin-
ciple, and obviously expressions such as "bona fide for the
benefit of the company as a whole", "fraud on a minority"
and "oppressive" do not assist in formulating a principle. I
have come to the conclusion that it would be unwise to try to
produce a principle, since the circumstances of each case are
infinitely varied. It would not, I think, assist to say more
than that in my judgment Miss Clemens is not entitled as of
right to exercise her votes as an ordinary shareholder in any
way she pleases. To use the phrase of Lord Wilberforce, that
right is "subject . . . to equitable considerations . . . which
may make it unjust . . . to exercise [it] in a particular
way."
27
Although the court's statement regarding the limitation on the ma-
jority's voting power seems to be couched in general terms it should not
be forgotten that this case concerned an alteration of the capital clause,
which is part of the memorandum of association. Thus, this court
merely returned to the category of alteration of the company's constitu-
tion, where the older cases already recognized the fiduciary duty of the
majority towards the minority. Indeed, even Gower, who recognizes a
certain fiduciary duty of the majority, states elsewhere in his book:
Scattered throughout the reports are statements that mem-
bers must exercise their votes "bona fide for the benefit of
the company as a whole," a statement which suggests that
they are subject to precisely the same rules as directors. But
it is clear that this is highly misleading, and that the deci-
sions do not support any such rule as a general principle. On
the contrary, it has been repeatedly laid down that votes are
proprietary rights, to the same extent as any other incidents
of the shares, which the holder may exercise in his own self-
ish interests even if these are opposed to those of the com-
pany. He may even bind himself by contract to vote or not to
vote in a particular way, and his contract may be enforced
by injunction. In all these respects the position of the share-
17 Id.
1991]
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holder is in striking contrast with that of the director.2"
Gower's conclusion regarding the duty of the majority to act for a
proper purpose appears based on how he wishes the law to develop,
rather than on the actual development of English case law.2 9
Pennington states that:
In the absence of contractual restraints, a member may vote
as he wishes at a general meeting, and may consult his pri-
vate interests exclusively, even though they conflict with
those of the company. This is so even though the member or
a group of members who act in concert can exercise or con-
trol a majority of the votes which may be cast. Unlike Amer-
ican law, English law has not developed the principle that a
controlling shareholder owes a fiduciary duty to the company
or to his fellow shareholders, and that his freedom to consult
only his own interests is correspondingly limited. 0
Despite the lack of recognition of a general fiduciary duty, Pennington
argues that resolutions to alter the memorandum and articles of associ-
ation and resolutions affecting class rights are valid only if passed in
good faith in the interests of the members or class of members as a
whole. In addition, the majority is restricted in that it cannot pass a
resolution which will be oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to other
members."1
Thus, the Clemens case did not induce Pennington to alter his
view as to the lack of a general fiduciary duty of the majority towards
the minority. However, this principle is subject to two exceptions which
differ in scope: that of fraud on the minority and that of the duty to act
bona fide for the benefit of the company in altering the company's
memorandum and articles. Clemens is cited by Pennington as an exam-
ple of the first exception. 2
Farrar regards the Clemens case as lending "some limited sup-
port" to the doctrine developed in the United States of the fiduciary
obligations that controlling shareholders owe to the other sharehold-
28 L. GOWER, supra note 22, at 614-15.
29 Indeed, in an opinion presented to the Department of Trade in 1980 concern-
ing a company's acquisition of its own shares, Gower points out that at general meet-
ings, in contrast to directors' meetings, members are generally allowed to vote in favour
of their own personal interests. See THE PURCHASE BY A COMPANY OF ITS OWN
SHARES, A CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, 1980, CMND. 7944, part II, para. 44.
20 R. PENNINGTON, COMPANY LAW 643 (6th ed. 1990).
S1 Id. at 643-44.
32 Id. at 643-44, 660.
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ers.33 He stresses, however, that "there is not yet full recognition of
fiduciary duties on controlling shareholders as such.""4
Within English legal literature, a middle position has been taken
between these two opposing views, the one recognizing a general fiduci-
ary duty of the majority towards the minority and the other recognizing
its application only in cases of alteration of the company's constitution
and fraud on the minority. According to this middle view, whether or
not the majority has a fiduciary duty towards the company and towards
the minority depends on the nature of the company. In a small, private,
or "domestic" company, where the management and the ownership are
largely identical, such a fiduciary duty ought to be recognized. How-
ever, no such duty should exist in large companies, where the share-
holder may take into account his own personal, and even selfish, inter-
ests when exercising his voting power in the company. 5
The differences of outlook in English legal literature are the result
of casuistic decisions in the English law, which are incapable of logical
explanation.
The rationale on which recognition of a fiduciary duty is based in
cases of alteration of the company's constitution or fraud on the minor-
ity is equally applicable to other resolutions passed by controlling
shareholders. This notion should bring about a change in the judicial
approach to this topic.
2.2. The American Approach
Unlike the English approach, case law in the United States has
recognized the existence of a fiduciary duty incumbent on controlling
shareholders.386 In order to determine whether the fiduciary duty has
been breached, various criteria have been put forward, the most promi-
nent of which are "valid purpose" and "compelling business reason.""
When the majority shareholders indicate a legitimate business aim for
their activity, the court will allow the minority to show that it was
33 J. FARRAR, COMPANY LAW 115 (2d ed. 1988).
3" Id. at 117.
11 Rider, Partnership Law and Its Impact on 'Domestic Companies' 38 CAM-
BRIDGE L.J. 148 (1979). This view is open to criticism. One may argue that it is
precisely in a large company that the need for protection is greater, owing to the sepa-
ration of control and ownership and the typical nonintervention of shareholders in the
company's affairs.
8 See, e.g., Linge v. Ralston Purina Co., 293 N.W.2d 191 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1980);
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505
(1975). See also W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS, §§ 5810-11 (rev. perm. ed. 1980); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF COR-
PORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 653-61 (3d ed. 1983).
" W. FLETCHER, supra note 36, at § 5811.20.
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possible to achieve the same legitimate aim in an alternative way, less
harmful to the minority.
38
In Delaware, it has been held that the breadth of the majority
shareholders' fiduciary duty is dependent on the circumstances of each
case.39 Generally, the activities of the majority will be examined by the
"business judgment rule." Under this rule, the court will not interfere
with those activities that have a rational business aim."' Where the mi-
nority shareholders (plaintiffs) manage to prove that the activity of the
majority involves "self-dealing" (for which the court adopts the "intrin-
sic fairness" test41) the burden of proving the fairness of the transaction
shifts to the majority (defendants).
42
2.3. The Israeli Approach
In Israel, the Supreme Court has recently considered the existence
of a fiduciary duty on controlling shareholders concerning the sale of
control. The Court adopted the American approach, recognizing the
existence of a fiduciary duty on controlling shareholders, in holding
that:
[A] controlling shareholder who wishes to sell his shares
owes a duty of loyalty to the company with respect to the
sale, and must act in good faith and honesty toward it, and
he will be in breach of his duty if he sells his shares to a
buyer who to the best of his knowledge will strip the com-
pany of its assets and lead to its insolvency. 3
The rationale for this rule lies in the power vested in the control-
ling shareholders. As explained by Justice Barak: "It is a known, rec-
ognized principle in our law that a holder of the controlling interest is
subject to a series of duties of loyalty, which are designed to limit the
one in control from abusing his power."44 Although Justice Barak em-
phasized in his judgment that he was not laying down a general rule
3S F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS LAW AND
PRACTICE § 8.08 (3d ed. 1986).
31 W. FLETCHER, supra note 36, at § 5811.20.
40 Id.
41 Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1971); Gabelli & Co.
v. Liggett Group Inc., 444 A.2d 261 (Del. Ch. 1982), affd, 479 A.2d 276 (Del. Sup.
Ct. 1984).
42 Weinberger v. UOP Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1983).
4' Kossoy v. Bank Feuchtwanger Ltd., 38 (3) P.D. 253, 284 (Israel 1984), re-
printed in 7 SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL 183, 215
(1983-87) (unofficial English translation).
44 Id. at 285, 7 SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL at
215.
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which imposed a fiduciary duty on controlling shareholders,45 the ra-
tionale for recognizing such a duty in respect to the sale of control is
equally applicable to other powers vested in controlling shareholders.
This leads to the conclusion that the voting power of controlling share-
holders is subject to a fiduciary duty, which they owe to the company
and to the minority.
In a later case, the Supreme Court of Israel held that the majority
shareholders are bound to exercise their power of control in good faith
for the benefit of the company.46
3. THE VIEW OF THE LEGISLATURES
3.1. Remedies in the Event of Prejudicial Treatment
Neither the English nor the Israeli legislatures have regulated the
duties of controlling shareholders towards the company or towards
other members.47 Nevertheless, the existence of such a duty can be in-
ferred from the statutory provisions, which provide a remedy for unfair
prejudicial treatment.
In England, this matter is regulated by sections 459-61 of the
Companies Act 1985,48 and in Israel, by section 235 of the Companies
Ordinance (New Version).49 Both statutes grant an injured member a
remedy when the company's affairs are conducted in a prejudicial man-
ner in relation to some members of the company. The relevant Israeli
statutory provision5" came into force about the same time as the En-
glish Act of 1980.51 The latter introduced the remedy in its present
5 Id. at 284, 7 SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL at
214.
48 Greiber v. Assessment Officer, 39 (2) P.D. 678, 688 (Israel 1985).
4' Additionally, in England directors' duties are not regulated by the legislature.
However, in Israel, a recently enacted amendment to the Companies Ordinance regu-
lates directors' duties: Companies Ordinance (Amendment No. 4) (Officers' Liabilities),
1991, Sefer Hahukim no. 1352 at 132.
48 Companies Act, 1985, ch. 6. Similar provisions are to be found in the corpora-
tion statutes of most of the common law countries. See, e.g.:
Australia - Companies Act 1989, § 260
Canada - Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-44, § 241(2)
Ghana - Companies Act 1961, § 218
India - Companies Act 1956, ch. 1 §§ 397-409
Malaysia - Companies Act 1956, § 181
New Zealand - Companies Act 1955, § 209
Singapore - Companies Act, Rev. Stat. 1970, ch. 185, § 181, Companies Act 1967, §
181 "
South Africa - Companies Act 1973, ch. 61
41 Companies Ordinance (New Version) § 235 (1983) (Israel).
50 Companies Ordinance (Amendment No. 17) § 118A (1980), reprinted in 35
LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 45, 48 (1980-81).
"' Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22.
1991]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
form, replacing the alternative remedy under section 210 of the 1948
Act.
52
The aforementioned statutory provisions in England and Israel are
not identical. For example, the Israeli provision does not explicitly refer
to the making of an order, where the intention is to perform an act or
make an omission that has not yet taken place. The Israeli provision
does not specifically relate to a single act or omission. An application
under the Israeli provision may be brought only by a member, whereas
the English statute widens the scope of potential plaintiffs to include
the Secretary of State, as well as a transferee of shares even if not regis-
tered in his name. The list of remedies specified in the English statute
is wider than that enumerated in the Israeli provision. For example,
the Israeli section is silent as to the remedy of empowering a share-
holder to initiate proceedings on the company's behalf. Further, the
English section refers to the consequences of an order to alter the com-
pany's memorandum or articles, a provision lacking in the Israeli
provision.
On the procedural level, there is also a difference between the Is-
raeli and English provisions. The Israeli provision mandates that the
applicant deliver a copy of his application, within fifteen days of sub-
mitting it, to the registrar of companies. The Israeli statute also re-
quires that the company deliver to the registrar a copy of the court
decision, within fifteen days from the time it was rendered. If the court
orders alterations to the memorandum or articles of association or to
the company's resolutions, the company must also deliver a copy of the
altered documents to the registrar. On the other hand, the English pro-
vision requires only that a copy of the order altering the memorandum
and articles, or allowing such alterations, be delivered to the registrar
within fourteen days from the day it was given.5"
Despite these differences, both legal systems recognize a member's
right to apply to the court for a remedy, where the company's affairs
are being conducted in a prejudicial manner. Conduct of the company's
affairs covers activities and resolutions of both the directors and the
controlling shareholders.54
Although these provisions are not worded in the form of a duty on
shareholders to refrain from prejudicial treatment, the existence of a
remedy for prejudicial treatment indicates the legislatures' views that
such a duty does exist. The remedy thus implies the existence of such a
duty.
52 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38.
5' Companies Act, 1985, ch. 6, § 461(5). The court may extend the period.
5" See, e.g., Whyte, Petitioner, [1984] 1 S.L.T. 330 (Extra Div. 1983).
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The various problems likely to arise in regard to the nature and
scope of the remedy for prejudicial treatment go beyond the scope of
this article. Succinctly put, the scope of the fiduciary duty of controlling
shareholders as mandated by statute will be determined by the way in
which the provisions granting the remedy are interpreted.
Both in England and Israel, case law has recognized that prejudi-
cial treatment exists whenever the legitimate expectations of the parties
are upset. Such a finding will persist even where the harmful conduct
does not amount to an infringement of a right conferred by the com-
pany's constitution.55 A member's right to sue for the infringement of
his legitimate expectations implies a correlative duty on those who con-
trol the company to refrain from conduct involving such infringement.
3.2. The Duty under Israeli Law to Act "In a Customary Manner
and in Good Faith".
The explanation given in the English cases for not recognizing a
general fiduciary duty (that is, the right of every person to act as he
wishes with respect to his own property), does not apply to Israeli law,
where no such right is recognized. Israeli law places restrictions on a
person's power to make use of his proprietary rights. Thus the Land
Law of 1969 provides that "ownership and other rights in immovable
property shall not by themselves justify the doing of anything that
causes damage or inconvenience to another." 6 Similarly, the Israeli
Contracts Law places a duty on every contractual party to exercise his
rights in a customary manner and in good faith.57 By virtue of that
duty, a party to a contract may not act as he wishes thereby ignoring
the interests of the other party. That duty applies to contractual and
noncontractual obligations, as well as to legal acts under an express
statutory provision.58 Such a provision can serve as an additional basis
under Israeli law for recognizing the fiduciary duty of controlling
shareholders. The shareholders, in their capacity as parties to the con-
tract embodied in the company's constitution, are bound to act in a
customary manner and in good faith.
The significance of this study was spelled out by the Supreme
Court of Israel in the following passage:
55 See Re Mossmain Ltd., 1981 P.C.C. 104, 110-11 (England's approach); Shasha
Sec. Co. Ltd. v. Adanim Bank, 42 (1) P.D. 14, 22 (Israel 1988) (Israel's approach).
56 Land Law § 14 (1969), reprinted in 23 LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 283,
285 (1968-69).
57 Contracts (General Part) Law § 39 (1973) reprinted in 27 LAWS OF THE
STATE OF ISRAEL 117, 123 (1972-74).
18 Id. at § 61(b), 27 LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL at 127.
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The parties to the contractual relationship are bound to deal
with each other honestly and fairly and according to what is
customary between honest parties to a contract. True, the
parties are not expected to act as angels towards each other,
but nor should they behave as wolves to each other .... All
parties to the contract should cooperate with each other, act-
ing out of consideration for the common interest which they
share in the contract. They should act in order to realize
their joint intent, remaining loyal to the purpose they set
themselves, and consistent in achieving their common, rea-
sonable expectations. 9
The expression "good faith" has been interpreted by the Israeli Su-
preme Court as having both an objective and a subjective meaning. The
objective dimension is measured by examining the conduct in question
with standards which society regards as proper. The subjective dimen-
sion implies that the acceptable standard of conduct is dependent on the
type of transaction, its location and terms, and on the individual char-
acteristics of the parties to the contract.
The criterion for determining what is "the customary manner" is
not the manner actually resorted to, but that which ought to be custom-
ary.60 The extent of "the customary manner" obligation may vary ac-
cording to the nature of the company and the status of the shareholders
in the company. Where a controlling shareholder is concerned, his duty
is more extensive. The "customary manner" of controlling shareholders
is not the same as that of the minority shareholders in the company.
Israeli law imposes a less burdensome statutory duty on non-controlling
shareholders.
If the approach put forward in this article is accepted, and a fidu-
ciary duty of controlling shareholders is recognized in England, there
will still be a difference between English and Israeli law. While Israeli
law obliges every shareholder, as a party to the contract contained in
the company's constitution, to act in a customary manner and in good
faith, English law recognizes no such duty.
4. WHAT IS CONTROL?
Recognition of the duty of controlling shareholders raises the ques-
tion as to defining "control." It is difficult to provide a precise defini-
, Beersheva Pub. Trans. Serv. Ltd. v. Israel Nat'l Labour Court, 35 (1) P.D.
828, 834 (Israel 1981) (unofficial English translation).
60 See Parcel 677 Block 6133 Co. v. Cohen, 29 (1) P.D. 365, 369 (Israel 1975).
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tion of this concept. 6 "Control" should be interpreted in the context in
which the question is considered. 2 In view of the purpose of placing a
fiduciary duty on controlling shareholders, "control" should exist in
every case where the shareholders have the power to affect the rights of
others. It is not essential for the shareholder to hold a majority of the
shares in the company for control to exist. Negative control is also rec-
ognized. This situation exists where some shareholders have the power
to prevent the passage of resolutions of which they disapprove. This
power rests in the holders of 26% of the voting rights whenever the law
requires a special resolution of the shareholders. Likewise, control can
exist in the holders of an even smaller percentage of shares, where the
shares are widely dispersed. This is known as "de facto control."
'6 3
Accordingly, control is defined in the Israeli Securities Law as
"the ability to direct the activity of the corporation."6 4 This definition
indicates that control is not dependent on holding the majority of voting
power. However, the statute goes on to provide that "a person is pre-
sumed to control a corporation if he holds one half or more of a partic-
ular type of means of control over the corporation." "Means of control"
is defined as either "(1) the right to vote at a general meeting of a
company or at a corresponding organ of some other corporate body; or
(2) the right to appoint the directors of a corporate body or its general
manager. ' 65 In other words, possession of more than half the voting
rights creates a presumption of control. Control can exist, however, in
holders of a smaller percentage of voting rights.
The definition of "control" under the American Law Institute's
Federal Securities Code is similar:
"Control" means the power, directly or indirectly, to exercise
a controlling influence over the management or policies of a
company or the activities of a natural person (either alone or
pursuant to an arrangement or understanding with one or
more other persons), whether through the ownership of vot-
ing securities, through one or more intermediary persons, by
61 See generally A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRI-
VATE PROPERTY 69-70 (rev. ed. 1982); Farrar, Ownership and Control of Listed Pub-
lic Companies: Revising-or Rejecting the Concept of Control, in COMPANY LAW IN
CHANGE: CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS (B. Pettet ed. 1987).
62 See generally J. FARRAR, supra note 33, at 411-12.
6S See generally Enstam & Kamen, Control and the Institutional Investor, 23
Bus. LAW 289, 301-15 (1967-68); Hornstein, Corporate Control and Private Property
Rules, 92 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1943-44).
64 Securities Law § 1, amended by Securities Law (Amendment no. 9), 1988,
Sefer Hahukim no. 1261 at 188.
65 Id.
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contract, or otherwise. 6
This definition makes it clear that the expression "control" should not
be given a technical or strict meaning; it should be interpreted in a
flexible manne r. "Controlling influence" is sufficient for control to be
recognized.
5. SCOPE OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF CONTROLLING
SHAREHOLDERS
The power in the hands of controlling shareholders is restrained
by means of a fiduciary duty placed on those wielding this power.
However, the mere recognition of a fiduciary duty on controlling share-
holders does not shed light on the scope of that duty. This was well put
by Justice Frankfurter when he stated:
But to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it
gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduci-
ary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what
respect has he failed to discharge these obligations? And
what are the consequences of his deviation from duty?67
The scope of the fiduciary duty owed by controlling shareholders
to the other shareholders is not equivalent to the duty owed by the
directors of the company to the company. Whereas the latter are re-
sponsible for the property of others and must therefore act in good
faith, taking into account solely the interests of the company, the former
act to further their own interests, as owners of the company's capital. 68
It follows that consideration of their personal interests, as shareholders,
should be recognized as legitimate.6 9 The appropriate balance between,
on the one hand, the interests of the controlling shareholders and on the
other hand, the interests of the company and its shareholders, will be
effected according to the specific circumstances of each case. This article
shall illustrate the extent of the fiduciary duty of controlling sharehold-
ers in two spheres: first, in the use to which the power of control is put,
and second, in the sale of control of the company by the shareholder.
66 FEDERAL SEC. CODE § 202(29) (1980).
87 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
es See Kossoy v. Bank Feuchtwanger Ltd., 38 (3) P.D. 253, 285 (Israel 1984)
(dictum of Justice Barak), reprinted in 7 SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF ISRAEL 183, 215 (1983-87) (unofficial English translation).
69 But cf. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 848-50, 353
N.E.2d 657, 661-63 (1976) (holding that shareholders of a close corporation owe each
other a duty of utmost good faith and loyalty).
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5.1. The Use of Control
5.1.1. Restriction on Voting Rights
a. In General
In various matters, company law confers a power on the majority
to pass resolutions binding on the minority opposing them. Within this
scope are included resolutions for altering the memorandum 70 and arti-
cles of association, 7 for winding-up the company, 72 for the company's
merger with another company,73 and for other resolutions that the law
or the company's constitution have authorized the general meeting to
decide upon.
In voting at the general meeting, the controlling shareholders owe
fiduciary duties to the company and to the minority shareholders.
However, the controlling shareholders are not required to disassociate
themselves entirely from their own interests as shareholders in the com-
pany. In this respect, the shareholders' duty differs from that of direc-
tors of the company.
Limitations on the right of shareholders to make use of their
power of control by means of voting in the company shall be illustrated
in the following context: first, resolutions for increasing the company's
capital; second, for winding-up the company; third, for dismissing a
director; and fourth, for voting agreements.
b. Increase of Capital
When the minority demands that the controlling shareholders pass
a resolution increasing the capital of the company, and those sharehold-
ers refuse to do so, does this amount to a breach of fiduciary duty on
the part of the controlling shareholders? If the controlling shareholders
have denied the request in order to strengthen their personal interests
in a rival business, then their conduct should be regarded as a breach of
the fiduciary duty owed to the company and the other shareholders.
However, if the controlling shareholders' motivation in voting against
the increase of capital is to preserve their voting rights in the company,
70 See Companies Ordinance (New Version) §§ 8, 25, 37(a), 144, 151 (1983)
(Israel); Companies Act, 1985, ch. 6, §§ 2(7), 28(1), 121, 135 (England); Companies
Act, 1989, ch. 40, § 110(2) (England).
" See Companies Ordinance (New Version) § 15 (1983) (Israel); Companies Act,
1985, ch. 6, § 9 (England).
72 See Companies Ordinance (New Version) §§ 257(1), 319 (1983) (Israel); Insol-
vency Act, 1986, ch. 45, §§ 84(1), 122(1)(a) (England).
" See Companies Ordinance (New Version) § 236 (1983) (Israel); Companies
Act, 1985, ch. 6, §§ 428-30 F (England).
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then no fiduciary breach should exist. The fact that there is no unis-
sued capital left in the company indicates that the parties intended that
any further allotment would be conditional on the consent of a major-
ity, the size of which is determined by statute.74 If the majority was
limited to considering only the needs of the company, there would be no
point in placing such a power in the majority, as opposed to the direc-
tors. The distinction between the power of allotment, which is con-
ferred on the directors, and the power to increase the registered capital,
which the law confers on the general meeting, reinforces this view.
Another possible limitation on voting power in this context arises
when controlling shareholders pass a resolution increasing the share
capital of the company with the intention of allotting the shares in a
proportion not reflective of their real value. The controlling sharehold-
ers enter this scheme knowing that the minority will not participate.
This scenario is a clear breach of fiduciary duty on the controlling
shareholders' part, since such an allotment would cause a diminution of
the share capital of the minority.7 5
The fiduciary duty which the majority shareholders owe to the
company and to the minority does not require them to extend financial
aid to the company when it experiences financial difficulties."6 The
shareholders of the company may rightfully limit their investment in
the company. A breach would not exist even where the controlling
shareholders are aware that such a contribution is the only way to save
the company from being wound up.
c. Winding Up
Both the English and the Israeli statutes recognize that sharehold-
ers may pass a resolution for voluntary winding up of the company.
The size of the requisite majority for such a resolution depends on the
cause for the winding up. Where the period for the company's existence
has terminated (as prescribed by the articles) or where an event has
occurred which brings about the company's dissolution (as per the arti-
cle), an ordinary resolution is sufficient. '7 A vote by the shareholders in
" The English statute requires an ordinary resolution of the general meeting.
Companies Act, 1985, ch. 6, § 121. The Israeli Ordinance requires a special resolution:
Companies Ordinance (New Version) § 144 (1983).
" The Supreme Court of Israel invalidated such an allotment in L. Gluckman
Ltd. v. A.M. Barkai Inv. Co. Ltd.,,32 (2) P.D. 281 (Israel 1978). But see F. O'NEAL
& R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 3:20 (2d
ed. 1985) (United States approach which permits controlling shareholders to diminish
the minority's interest in the corporation by causing the issuance of additional shares).
78 See W. FLETCHER, supra note 36, at § 5810.
See Companies Ordinance (New Version) § 319(1) (1983) (Israel); Insolvency
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support of the winding up, in such a case, is within the scope of their
fiduciary duty.
Where the company has liabilities that prevent it from carrying on
its business, the company can pass an extraordinary resolution for vol-
untarily winding up.78 In that case, a vote by the shareholders in sup-
port of the winding up also presents no problem. The third possibility
of a voluntary winding up arises when the company passes a special
resolution mandating that the company be wound up voluntarily.79
Thus, when a supermajority of the members want the company dis-
solved, without a special reason for winding up the company, a special
resolution is required.
Clearly, in such a situation one cannot speak of the good of the
company, since its dissolution cannot be consistent with its good.80 A
resolution to wind up the company may well encounter the opposition
of the minority. Should the majority consider the wishes of the minor-
ity, who seek the continued existence of the company, or may the ma-
jority act according to its own interests, in favour of dissolving the
company?
Where the resolution of the controlling shareholders is not moti-
vated by an intent to harm the company or the minority, their desire to
wind up the company should be respected. Thus, the controlling share-
holders' resolution should not be regarded as a breach of duty."" The
decision of the controlling shareholders to cease company operations is
a proper use of the right conferred on them by statute, even if such a
resolution may harm the shareholders who oppose dissolution. This
precept applies only when winding up is the only solution available to
the controlling shareholders of a company. When the controlling share-
holders are able to achieve their objective by selling their shares, the
exercise of their right to wind up the company will amount to a breach
of their fiduciary duty. However, when the controlling shareholders are
unable to sell their shares (for example, where the minority sharehold-
ers lack the means to acquire the shares and no one outside the com-
Act, 1986, ch. 45, § 84(1)(a) (England).
76 See Companies Ordinance (New Version) § 319 (3) (1983) (Israel); Insolvency
Act, 1986, ch. 45, § 84(1)(c) (England).
79 See Companies Ordinance (New Version) § 319 (2) (1983) (Israel); Insolvency
Act, 1986, ch. 45, § 84(1)(b) (England).
80 However, consider a case where the company suffers heavy losses. In this in-
stance the winding up falls under different provisions. Companies Ordinance (New
Version) § 319(3) (1983) (Israel); Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, § 84(1)(c) (England).
s1 See Greenfield v. Denner, 199 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1960) (holding that majority
stockholders may liquidate a corporation without fear of a fiduciary breach to a pro-
testing minority shareholder).
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pany is available to acquire the shares),82 there would be nothing
wrong in a resolution to wind up the company. No fiduciary breach on
the controlling shareholders' behalf exists even though their conduct is
inconsistent with the good of the company or its minority shareholders.
d. Dismissal of a Director
In determining the extent of the controlling shareholders' fiduciary
duty, the nature of the company should be taken into account. Thus,
for example, controlling shareholders in companies which are "quasi-
partnerships" ' , will be subject to fiduciary duties similar to those of
partners in a partnership. The standard as enunciated by United States
case law is that of "utmost good faith and loyalty."84 Accordingly, a
United States court held that the termination of a minority share-
holder's employment as a director of a "quasi-partnership" company
amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty on the majority's behalf. As
expressed by the court: "In sum, by terminating a minority stock-
holder's employment or by severing him from a position as an officer or
director, the majority effectively frustrates the minority stockholder's
purposes in entering on the corporate venture and also deny him an
equal return on his investment.",
5
English law has recognized that where a director of a quasi-part-
nership company is dismissed, a winding up is justified for reasons of
justice and equity. 6 It is unsettled in England whether a member, who
82 Such a situation is likely to arise when the company relies heavily on the skill
of a controlling shareholder who is leaving the company (for example, a company pro-
viding engineering services or a company engaged in specialized art, such as sculpture).
83 These companies were defined by the House of Lords in Ebrahimi v. West-
bourne Galleries Ltd., [1972] 2 All E.R. 492, 500 (H.L.), as follows:
Certainly the fact that a company is a small one, or a private company, is
not enough. There are very many of these where the association is a
purely commercial one, of which it can safely be said that the basis of
"association is adequately and exhaustively laid down in the articles. The
superimposition of equitable considerations requires something more,
which typically may include one, or probably more, of the following ele-
ments: (i) an association formed or continued on the basis of a personal
relationship, involving mutual confidence - this element will often be
found where a pre-existing partnership has been converted into a limited
company; (ii) an agreement, or understanding, that all, or some (for there
may be "sleeping" members), of the shareholders shall participate in the
conduct of the business; (iii) restriction on the transfer of the members'
interest in the company - so that if confidence is lost, or one member is
removed from management, he cannot take out his stake and go elsewhere.
See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 848, 353 N.E.2d
657, 661 (1976).
85 Id. at 850, 353 N.E.2d at 662-63.
" Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd., [1972] 2 All E.R. 492 (H.L.).
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is dismissed from his position as a director of the company, is entitled
to claim any other remedy. A possible remedy arises under the provi-
sions granting a remedy in the event of prejudicial treatment. In a case
that dealt with an application for a remedy under section 210 of the
1948 Act,87 the application was rejected because the dismissal did not
affect the member in his capacity as a director, which was a prerequi-
site for this remedy. 8 Case law dealing with the remedy, which re-
placed the "alternative remedy" as provided under sections 459-61 of
the 1985 statute, is not uniform as to whether the said limitation also
exists under those sections.8 9 The more recent cases tend to allow a
member to base a claim on those sections for dismissal of a director in a
quasi-partnership company.90 Israeli cases have also recognized that
dismissal of a director of such a company serves as a basis for providing
a remedy for unfairly prejudicial treatment."'
Recognition of a right to sue for a remedy in the event of prejudi-
cial treatment following the dismissal of a director in a quasi-partner-
ship company does not mean that all such dismissals will serve as a
basis for imposing liability. Thus, for example, where the articles of the
company fairly regulate the disposition of a dismissed director's shares,
the dismissed director cannot argue that he was unfairly prejudiced as a
result of the enforcement of such an agreement.
Such a situation came up for consideration in England."2 The arti-
cles of association in that case provided that a member who had ceased
to serve as director was bound to give notice of the transfer of his shares
within fourteen days. Such notice would be deemed given, even if not
actually provided.9" Notice of transfer rendered the company the agent
of the seller for the purpose of selling the shares to other members. The
articles provided that the sale price should be agreed upon between the
seller and the directors.9 4 In the event of a dispute, the auditor of the
company would determine the fair value of the shares on a sale by a
87 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, § 210.
88 Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd., [1972] 2 All E.R. 492 (H.L.).
8 Some courts have recognized the continued application of the limitation. See,
e.g., In re a Company (No. 004475 of 1982), [1983] 2 W.L.R. 381 (Ch.); In re a
Company (No. 008699 of 1985), 1986 P.C.C. 296, 302 (Ch.). However, other courts
have recognized the possibility of a remedy for dismissal from a managerial position in
quasi-partnership-type companies. See infra note 90.
10 In re a Company (No. 002576 of 1982), [1983] 2 All E.R. 854; In re a Com-
pany (No. 00477 of 1986), [1986] B.C.L.C. 376; Re Mossmain Ltd., [1987] P.C.C.
104.
*" Re Matzot Israel Co. Ltd., 5746 (3) P.M. 221 (Israel 1986); Raviv v. Limat
Metal Polishing Ltd., (Tel-Aviv District Court 1985) (unpublished).
92 In re a Company (No. 004377 of 1986), [1987] 1 W.L.R. 102 (Ch.).
93 Id. at 105.
94 Id.
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willing vendor to a willing purchaser. 5 The directors were to divide
the shares among the members applying to acquire them, and the seller
was to transfer the shares accordingly.
The petitioner was dismissed from his position as a director of the
company, which initiated the procedure laid down in the articles re-
garding the transfer of his shares to other members.9 6 The seller and
directors could not reach an agreement; the price of the shares was
therefore determined by the .company's auditor. The petitioner based
his claim on unfairly prejudicial treatment. The dismissed director ar-
gued that he had become a company member on the basis of his legiti-
mate expectation that he would participate in running the company.
Thus his dismissal should be regarded as prejudicial treatment entitling
him to a remedy. 97 Justice Hoffmann dismissed this argument, holding
as follows:
I cannot accept that if there is an irretrievable breakdown in
relations between members of a corporate quasi-partnership,
the exclusion of one from management and employment is
ipso facto unfairly prejudicial conduct which entitles him to
petition under section 459. It must depend on whether, if
there is to be a parting, it is reasonable that he should leave
rather than the other member or members and on the terms
he is offered for his shares or in compensation for his loss of
employment. 98
In this case, the articles regulated the relations among the mem-
bers in the event of a crisis. Since a method for determining the fair
value of the shares was provided in the articles, there could be no argu-
ment of prejudicial treatment. Of course, the situation would have been
different if the articles prescribed an arbitrary or artificial method of
valuation, or if bad faith had been proven on the part of some of the
members.99 A provision that requires an objective auditor to determine
the fair value of the shares confers on the auditor a function similar to
that which the court would exercise in giving a remedy for a holding of
prejudicial treatment. There is, therefore, no reason to resort to legal
95 Id.
96 Id. at 106.
97 Id. at 108.
98 Id. at 109.
99 Id. at 110. See also Justice Hoffman's decision in In re a Company, ex parte
Kremer, [1989] B.C.L.C. 365, 367 (holding that a court will not grant a remedy under
section 459 where the proper solution is for the plaintiff to sell his shares at a fair
price, and the articles include provisions determining that price, or the respondent pro-
poses to refer the determination to objective settlement).
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proceedings in such a case. Legal proceedings would merely be more
lengthy and more costly than abiding by the procedures laid down in
the articles. A claim that the auditor had made an erroneous valuation
would not justify an application for a holding of prejudicial treatment.
However, a claim of negligence against the auditor or proceedings for
annulment of the valuation could exist.'00 Similarly, it has been held in
Israel that the dismissal of a director, effected in compliance with an
agreement entered into by the parties and stipulating a fixed period of
service in that capacity, did not amount to prejudicial treatment.' 0 '
e. Voting Agreements
English common law recognizes the validity of voting agreements
among shareholders,' whereas it denies the validity of such agree-
ments when made among directors of a company. 0 3 This stance has
been adopted in Israeli case law.'04 Is there any room for a change in
the rule that recognizes the validity of voting agreements among share-
holders in view of a fiduciary duty on controlling shareholders?
Voting agreements among directors are invalid because such an
agreement conflicts with the directors' duty to act in good faith for the
benefit of the company. The only considerations that the directors may
take into account are those relating to the well-being of the company.
The English statute provides that, within this scope, the directors
should take into account the good of the shareholders and employees of
the company. 0 5 In Israel, there is no similar statutory provision. Ear-
lier case law has held that the directors must act solely for the benefit
of the company.'0 8 This view has been modified by the President of the
Supreme Court of Israel. He believes that the directors should take into
account the good of the shareholders, the employees of the company, its
customers, and the wider public in general. 0 7 Under both legal sys-
tems, it is clear that the directors are not permitted to take into account
their own personal interests within the scope of their activity in the
company or other interests beyond those permitted by law. Where the
directors' discretion is fettered in advance by a voting agreement, this
100 Id. at 111.
11" Dolev v. Rav-Bariach Ltd., (Tel-Aviv District Court 1986) (unpublished).
101 See L. GOWER, supra note 22, at 568-69; R. PENNiNGTON, supra note 30, at
643.
103 L. GOWER, supra note 22, at 582.
104 Mann v. Ayon, 11 P.D. 1612 (Israel 1957); Jerusalem Indus. Co. v. Agyon, 6
P.D. 887 (Israel 1952).
106 Companies Act, 1985, ch. 6, § 309.
106 See, e.g., Jerusalem Indus. Co. v. Agyon, 6 P.D. 887 (Israel 1952).
101 Penidar Co. Inv., Dev. & Bldg. Ltd. v. Castro, 37 (4) P.D. 673 (Israel 1983).
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undertaking may deprive the director of taking into account only the
aforementioned considerations. Hence such an agreement is invalid.
With regard to shareholders, the situation is different because the
fiduciary duty of shareholders differs in scope from that of directors.
Shareholders may also take into account their interests as owners of
proprietary rights, within certain limitations as indicated above. It fol-
lows that even after recognizing the existence of the fiduciary duty of
shareholders, a voting agreement between shareholders need not be in-
validated a priori.
At the same time, such an agreement cannot justify action by con-
trolling shareholders which is contrary to the principles detailed above.
It is not the voting agreement that brings about a right of action; it is
the use of voting power in a way amounting to a breach of duty that
initiates a right of action. The agreement itself may be impugned, when
it clearly involves a deviation from the fiduciary duty of the controlling
shareholders. However, where the agreement merely regulates the duty
to coordinate voting, this does not in itself constitute a basis for im-
pugning the agreement. Indeed, United States law, which recognizes
the fiduciary duty of controlling shareholders, validates voting agree-
ments between shareholders of a company. 08 The aforementioned limi-
tations are effective, though. Thus in the United States, an agreement
among shareholders concerning the election of directors or officers, so
as to secure or retain control of the corporation, has been recognized as
valid. O United States case law has held that "[a company's] stockhold-
ers may agree to combine their votes. If their purpose is lawful and not
against public policy, fraudulent or harmful to creditors, their agree-
ment is binding among themselves."' x 0
Most jurisdictions in the United States acknowledge the validity of
voting agreements among shareholders under statutory provisions."'
Section 7.31 of the Model Business Corporation Act, which has been
adopted in many states, provides: "(a) Two or more shareholders may
provide for the manner in which they will vote their shares by signing
an agreement for that purpose . . . . (b) A voting agreement created
under this section is specifically enforceable."" ' 2
In Israel, the cases which have recognized the validity of a voting
agreement among shareholders preceded the recognition of the fiduciary
duty of the majority shareholders. Since the recognition of such a duty,
o W. FLETCHER, supra note 36, §§ 2064, 2066.-
109 See, e.g., Glazer v. Glazer, 374 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1967).
110 Bator v. United Sausage Co., 138 Conn. 18, 22, 81 A.2d 442, 444 (1951).
1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 36, § 2064.1.
112 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.31 (1979).
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the question concerning the validity of a voting agreement has not as
yet been revisited. It is the author's opinion that such an agreement
should be acknowledged as valid, subject to the limitations indicated
above.
The proposed Fifth European Economic Community Directive de-
nies validity to voting agreements that restrict the freedom of a share-
holder to vote. Article 35 of the Directive provides:
Agreements whereby a shareholder undertakes to vote
in any of the following ways shall be void:
(a) that he will always follow the instructions of
the company or of one of its organs;
(b) that he will always approve proposals made by
the company or by one of its organs;
(c) that he will vote in a specified manner, or
abstain, in consideration of special advantages.'-"
5.1.2. Taking Account of Considerations Beyond the Good of the
Company
May the controlling shareholders take into account considerations
beyond those that are for the good of the company and its shareholders,
such as the benefit of the company's employees, its customers, and the
public at large? This question has attracted considerable discussion in
the United States in regard to the directors of the company." 4 The
tendency in the United States is to allow these considerations to be
11s Amended Proposal for a Fifth Directive Founded on Article 54(3Xg) of the
EEC Treaty Concerning the Structure of Public Limited Companies and the Power
and Obligations of Their Organs, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C240) 2 (1983).
114 See the well-known debate between Berle and Dodd, as expressed in articles
they published on this matter: Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV.
L. REV. 1049 (1931); Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932); Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties
of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194 (1935). Whereas Berle is
in favour of considering only the good of the company, Dodd thinks that, in modern
society, the good of the public at large must also be considered. See Werner, Manage-
ment, Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and Means Reconsidered, 77
COLJM. L. REV. 388 (1977); Wetzel & Winokur, Corporations and the Public Inter-
est -A Review of the Corporate Purpose and Business Judgment Rules, 27 Bus. LAW.
235 (1971); Note, Herald Co. v. Seawell: A New Corporate Social Responsibility?, 121
U. PA. L. REV. 1157 (1973). See also M. BEESLEY & T. EVANS, CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY - A REASSESSMENT (1978); B. LONGSTRETH & H. ROSENBLOOM,
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (1973);
Manne, Should Corporations Assume More Social Responsibilities?, in THE ATTACK
ON CORPORATE AMERICA 3 (1978). This question occupied the central position at a
symposium devoted to it, the deliberations of which were published in 30 HASTINGS
L.J. 1247-1462 (1978-79).
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taken into account.1 15
This approach has found expression in Israel through Justice
Shamgar, the President of the Supreme Court of Israel. He has stated
in obiter dictum: "It would seem that the modern development is that
the company and its directors acting on its behalf should take into ac-
count not only the good of the shareholders ... but also the good of the
employees of the company, its customers and the wider public at
large." ' This dictum is worded in the language of duty, in contrast to
the conferring of a right on the directors to consider the said interests.
Since the statement was made obiter, one cannot, in the author's opin-
ion, derive from it a ruling that a duty exists on the part of the direc-
tors to take into account these considerations. At the very least, how-
ever, the right of the directors to take these considerations into account
is recognized.
English law, since 1980, confers on directors explicit authority to
consider the good of employees.1 7 However, the law does not extend its
provisions to encompass the good of the wider public. A sound basis
exists for the assertion that the English legislature thereby expressed its
opinion that such a wide consideration is beyond the directors'
authority.
The view which legitimates taking into account the above consid-
erations has been accepted in other legal systems as well. The German
Corporations Law of 1937 expressly provided that the board of direc-
tors should manage the company in accordance with its needs and the
needs of its employees, as well as for the good of the public as a
whole. 1 The German Corporations Law of 1965 omits the groups to
be taken into consideration by the directors in managing the com-
pany. " However, most commentators are of the opinion that the prin-
'5 See, e.g., Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972). But see
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919) (espousing the older
view that the corporation should be managed exclusively for the benefit of the
shareholders).
'16 Penidar Co. Inv., Dev. & Bldg. Ltd. v. Castro, 37 (4) P.D. 673 (Israel 1983).
'"7 Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22, § 46 ("The matters to which the directors of a
company are to have regard in the performance of their functions shall include the
interest of the company's employees in general as well as the interests of its mem-
bers."). This section now appears in Companies Act, 1985, ch. 6 § 309. Likewise,
English law allows a company to grant a benefit to employees when the business ceases
to exist or is transferred, even though this is not in the interests of the company. Com-
panies Act, 1985, ch. 6, §§ 659, 719.
118 Aktiengesetz [AktG] § 70(1), 1937 Reichsgesetzblatt [RGB1] I (W. Ger.).
1" See § 76(1) of the 1965 statute. Aktiengesetz [AktG] § 76(1), 1965
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1 I 1105 (W. Ger.). This omission has been explained by the
fact that these principles are self-evident. See E. ERCKLENTZ, MODERN GERMAN COR-
PORATION LAW 197 (1979).
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ciple adopted in the 1937 statute remains valid, even after the new stat-
ute was enacted.
1 20
In Austria, this principle has survived in the 1965 statute which
provides that the directors must run the company for its own good, and
must take into consideration the interests of the shareholders, the em-
ployees, and the public.'
21
While in the above legal systems discussion has focused on the
fiduciary duties of directors, an analogy can nevertheless be drawn
therefrom in respect to shareholders. A common bond exists between
both groups: the recognition of a fiduciary duty which stems from the
power entrusted to them. Moreover, one can argue a fortiori that if the
directors, whose fiduciary duty towards the company is stricter than
that of the shareholders, can take those considerations into account, the
shareholders are even more justified in doing so.' 22 In this author's
opinion, there is room for broadening the considerations that the share-
holders in large companies should be allowed to take into account so as
to include those involving the good of the public in general. Even the
English courts could reach this conclusion, despite the section of the
statute which permits the directors to take into account the good of the
employees and no other additional considerations besides the good of
the company. 22 This limitation, applicable to directors, does not neces-
sarily have to be applied to the shareholders who, in their activity
within the company, may take into account additional interests beyond
those in regard to the good of the company.
5.2. The Sale of Controlling Shares
5.2.1. Restriction of the Right of Sale
The Israeli Supreme Court has recognized the existence of the fi-
duciary duty of controlling shareholders when selling their shares in
the company. 12 As to the scope of that duty, Justice Barak has held
120 See authorities cited in: Roth, Corporate Social Responsibility: European
Models, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1433, 1437, n.11 (1978-79). See also E. ERCKLENTZ,
supra note 119, at 197 (stating that these interests of the company - of its sharehold-
ers, of its employees and of the public at large - are of equal weight).
"I Aktiengesetz [AKtG] § 70(1), 1965 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] IV (Austria).
See also Roth, supra note 120, at 1437.
"' The dictum of the President of the Israeli Supreme Court, Justice Shamgar,
quoted above, refers to a company and its directors. See supra note 116 and accompa-
nying text. The basic organs of a company are the general meeting and the board of
directors. In view of, the specific reference to the directors, it would seem that when
referring to the company, the President meant the general meeting of the shareholders.
123 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
124 In regard to the application of fiduciary duties connected with the sale of con-
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that:
[Tihe controlling shareholder is free to sell his shares to any
purchaser, unless he knows that the purchaser is about to
acquire control of the company and strip it of its assets. This
provides the appropriate balance between the prerogative of
ownership on the one hand, and the protection of the good of
the company on the other.
1 25
Thus, the sale of control to a purchaser who, to the knowledge of
the controlling shareholder, intends to harm the company, amounts to a
breach of the fiduciary duty that the controlling shareholder owes to the
company and to the other shareholders. Such a breach confers on the
latter a right of action against the controlling shareholder for breach of
contract.
In Israel, the question of whether in these circumstances, negli-
gence (where a reasonable shareholder should have known of likely
harm to the company) on the shareholder's behalf will suffice for a
finding of liability remains open.1 26 The United States view is that such
circumstances raise the suspicion of a breach of the fiduciary duty, un-
less a reasonable inquiry brings to light facts which would convince a
reasonable person that no fraud was intended or expected.
12 7
The imposition of liability where the controlling shareholders
merely ought to know that those acquiring control would harm the
company appears draconian. However, it can be explained in two
ways. First, proof of actual knowledge is difficult, and therefore the law
attributes to a person knowledge that a reasonable person in these cir-
cumstances would have had. Second, where a reasonable person would
have realized that a person acquiring control would harm the company,
but the controlling shareholder failed to do so, then his omission
amounts to negligence. This standard of culpability is adequate to find
liability in this instance.
5.2.2. The Right to a Premium
Who is entitled to benefit from the proceeds of sale of controlling
shares? Are controlling shareholders who receive a "control premium"
trol, it is sufficient that the shareholder is one of the controlling group; he does not need
to be the sole controller. See Kossoy v. Bank Feuchtwanger Ltd., 38 (3) P.D. 253, 287
(Israel 1984) (dictum of Justice Barak), reprinted in 7 SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL 183, 217 (1983-87) (unofficial English translation).
125 Id. at 286, 7 SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL at
216.
126 Id.
117 W. FLETCHER, supra note 36, at § 5805.
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(that is, an amount above the market price for the controlling shares
vested in the holders of the shares sold) entitled to keep it for them-
selves, or should they share the premium with the other shareholders in
the company?
This question has not yet been dealt with by Israeli courts, al-
though it has been widely discussed in United States case law and legal
literature. The traditional United States view has held that a control-
ling shareholder may receive and retain a premium for the sale of his
shares, without breaching a duty.128 However, a contrary view has de-
veloped in the United States, whereby the vendor of the controlling
block of shares is bound to share the premium received with the minor-
ity shareholders.
This latter view is based on a number of legal theories. The first
legal theory in making the controlling shareholder share the control
premium is the breach of fiduciary duty theory. Such liability is based
on the notion that controlling shareholders, like directors, are bound to
account for profits gained by exploiting their status in the company. 2 "
Those who support this view argue that one of the fiduciary duties of
the controlling shareholders is to select their successors. Sale of the con-
trolling shares is thus an act involving a fiduciary duty, so that any
premium paid to the vendor is in the nature of a "bribe" or a profit
belonging to the company. The premium should be treated as any other
personal profit earned by a trustee in the course of fulfilling his
functions.' 3o
The second legal theory is the sale of corporate office doctrine.
The courts have at times referred to the sale of controlling shares as
including, as an integral part thereof, the sale of corporate offices. Such
positions, the courts have held, are the property of the company, so that
the controlling shareholders cannot exploit them for their own pur-
poses, either directly or indirectly. Thus, if the controlling shareholders
make a profit from the sale of those positions, they must disgorge such
profit to the general body of shareholders. 3 '
A third legal theory to mandate the sharing of a control premium
is the diversion of corporate opportunity theory. This concept posits
122 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 75, at § 4:02.
"I Id. at § 4:04.
130 This is the view of D. Bayne, as expressed in a series of articles, subsequently
incorporated in D. BAYNE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CORPORATE CONTROL, ch. 5 (1986).
For criticism of this view see Hayes, Sale of Control of a Corporation: Who Gets the
Premium?, 4 J. CORP. L. 243, 255-59 (1978-79); Hazen, The Sale of Corporate Con-
trol: Towards a Three-Tiered Approach, 4 J. CORP. L. 263, 271-74 (1978-79).
's3 See, e.g., Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 435, 91 A. 428, 431-32 (1914). See
also F. O'NRAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 75, at § 4:04.
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liability if vendors divert from the company an opportunity to sell its
assets (the control premium). A similar thrust of this theory would
charge the controlling shareholder with fraudulently frustrating some
company act which, if carried out, would have benefitted the sharehold-
ers as a whole.'1
2
The last legal theory treats control as an asset of the company. In
the well-known case of Perlman v. Feldmann,33 a United States court
held by a majority that control is an asset of the company. Thus, a
controlling shareholder who sold his shares at a higher price than could
be obtained for the sale of noncontrolling shares is bound to disgorge to
the company the premium he received.' In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Swan stated, "Concededly a majority or dominant shareholder
is ordinarily privileged to sell his stock at the best price obtainable from
the purchaser. In so doing he acts on his own behalf, not as an agent of
the corporation.'
3 5
The majority ruling in the Perlman case has been criticised in
legal literature 3 6 and later cases have refused to follow it.' As already
stated, the question has not yet been discussed in Israel. The author
prefers the minority opinion in Perlman to that of the majority. Con-
trol over the company, deriving from the rights attached to the shares
held by a controlling shareholder, can legitimately be regarded as his
property. Hence, he is entitled to retain the premium he received from
the sale of control. Nor do the other grounds for justifying the view that
the controlling shareholder should share the control premium stand up
to criticism. There is no reason to regard the sale of the shares as a
breach of a fiduciary duty by the controlling shareholder, unless the
sale was to "looters" who are likely to harm the company. The profit
derived by the controlling shareholder on the sale of control is not ac-
131 By selling the control shares, the controlling shareholders frustrate an offer for
acquisition addressed to all shareholders. See Dunnett v. Arn, 71 F.2d 912 (10th Cir.
1934); F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 75, at § 4:04; Note, 20 CORNELL
L.Q. 101 (1934).
183 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
134 See Berle, 'Control' in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 1212, 1220-22
(1958); Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of Corporate Control, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 628
(1965). Some consider that the true basis for the decision is the diversion of an opportu-
nity away from the company, and not the sale of its asset. See F. O'NEAL & R.
THOMPSON, supra note 75, at § 4:05.
185 Perlman, 219 F.2d at 179 (Swan, J. dissenting).
1"I See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE
L.J. 698 (1982); Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARV. L. REv. 986 (1957);
Procaccia, Regulating the Allocation of Voting Rights in Large Corporations, 13
MISHPATIM 357, 368 (1984).
87 See, e.g., Delano v. Kitch, 663 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1981); Essex Universal
Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962); Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d
667 (8th Cir. 1962); Thompson v. Hambrick, 508 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
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quired through exploitation of that shareholder's status in the company,
but from the sale of an asset belonging to him. Even though a pur-
chaser can be appointed to a managerial position in the company after
control is acquired, the sale of the shares, by itself, cannot be regarded
as the sale of a position belonging to the company. Likewise, the author
refuses to accept the third line of reasoning, referred to above, in justifi-
cation of the opposite view. The mere sale of the shares cannot be re-
garded as a diversion of a corporate opportunity. Such a diversion may
exist when a purchaser seeks to acquire the company's assets and the
controlling shareholder causes the buyer to purchase control instead of
the company's assets.1"8 However, in the ordinary situation, no fault
can be found in the sale of controlling shares. The right of a share-
holder who has sold control to benefit from the proceeds of sale has
been acknowledged as advantageous to the company, because the sale of
the control benefits the company. 3 ' Recognizing the controlling share-
holder's right to retain the proceeds of the sale of control will encourage
that shareholder to sell control, which results in a better allocation of
resources. In this way, the company and all its shareholders will
benefit.
6. CONCLUSION
Currently, English law does not recognize a general fiduciary duty
of controlling shareholders. Restrictions on the power vested in the ma-
jority are recognized, under the common law, in two categories of cases:
alteration of memorandum and articles of association, and fraud on the
minority. United States law recognizes a general fiduciary duty of con-
trolling shareholders and following this lead, Israel now recognizes
such a duty.
Recognition of a general fiduciary duty of controlling shareholders
in a company follows inevitably from two sources: first, from legal
principles that impose a fiduciary duty on anyone having control over
the assets of another; and second, from statutory provisions conferring
on every member of the company the right to apply for a remedy
against the controlling shareholders for conduct prejudicial to the mi-
nority. Such recognition does not amount to the imposition of a fiduci-
ary duty on controlling shareholders to the extent of that imposed on
"" W. CARY AND M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
677-78 (6th ed. 1988).
139 Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. LAW & ECON. 395
(1983); Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698
(1981-82).
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directors of the company. In view of the special status of the share-
holder in the company, he must be allowed to take into account his own
personal interests, albeit to a limited extent.
The common law, which has always adjusted itself to changing
realities, ought to deviate from the ruling that recognizes the right of
the shareholder to vote as he wishes, subject to well-defined exceptions.
Instead, the common law should adopt a general fiduciary duty of the
controlling shareholders of a company.
In Israel, in addition to the fiduciary duty of controlling share-
holders, the duty of every shareholder to act in a customary manner
and in good faith exists. This latter duty is not as extensive as the
fiduciary duty of the controlling shareholders. Both duties are directed
towards instituting reasonable and fair rules of conduct in the relations
between company shareholders.
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